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The Turn of the Twentieth Century as the Dawn of
Contract "Interpretation": Reflections in Theories of
Impossibility
Marcia J. Speziale*
INTRODUCTION
In the nineteenth century, when the individual was all, Herbert
Spencer was in vogue, and the best government imposed few re-
straints, Americans held high this standard: Freedom of Contract.'
Rarely would a court fail to enforce the literal terms of a private
agreement, even in the face of unforeseen circumstances. Judicial
heads would bow to the exact terms of a contractual arrangement
as a manifestation of individual wills and parties were held to their
promises "at all events."2 Little room was left for judges to innovate
or interfere. In the twentieth century, courts still act in the name
of contract "freedom," but they have taken a more active role in
* A.B., Trinity College; J.D., University of Connecticut. The author is currently a Teach-
ing Fellow at Stanford Law School and will receive a J.S.M. from Stanford in 1979.
This article is dedicated to Carolyn and Robert Birmingham, Professors of Law, The Uni-
versity of Connecticut School of Law, who rendered crucial assistance during sowing and
growing. Special thanks also go to Thomas H. Jackson, Associate Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School, who helped with the harvest.
1. If there is one thing more than any other which public policy requires, it is that
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contract-
ing, and that contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held good
and shall be enforced by courts of justice.
Sir George Jessel in Printing Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462 (1875), quoted in Diamond
Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 482 (1887). See also Hall Mfg. Co. v. W. Steel & Iron
Works, 227 F. 588 (7th Cir. 1915); Styles v. Lyon, 87 Conn. 23, 86 A. 564 (1913); Harbison-
Walker Refractories Co. v. Stanton, 227 Pa. 55 (1910).
2. Conlen, Intervening Impossibility of Performance as Affecting the Obligations of
Contracts, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 28, 29-31 (1917).
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contract "interpretation": deciding what the parties meant by ask-
ing what they would have provided had they foreseen the contin-
gency; finding what results were within the contemplation of the
parties; implying conditions because the parties must have meant
to; reallocating the burdens wrought by a surprise outcome, based
upon considerations of policy and justice.3 Interpretation (deviation
from express contractual terms) signaled a new active judicial func-
tion: injection of socio-economic and political ideas into contract
litigation. The turn of the century, then, was the pivotal point in a
movement from strict Freedom of Contract to a less literal version
of that ideal; judges joined in a general overthrow of the laissez-faire
ideology and developed contract theories in the process.
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
There are times when interrelations and connections between pol-
itical philosophy, literary conventions, economic theory, and law are
more pronounced than at other times.' This is true of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, when a laissez-faire spirit pre-
dominated, finding expression in various avenues of thought and in
many aspects of life. In a 1921 article, Freedom of Contract, Samuel
Williston wrote:
The theorizing in metaphysics, politics and economics, could
not fail to have its effect on the law, and the law of contracts
was a field in which its application was not difficult. Indeed it
was a corollary of the philosophy of freedom and individualism
that the law ought to extend the sphere and enforce the obliga-
tion.5
And so it has been said that in the nineteenth century "contract law
reached its zenith . . . as the legal underpinning of a dynamic and
expanding free enterprise economy."' "'The market took on legal
3. There has, in effect, been a "socialization" of the law of contract, representing in part
"an expansion of the scope of social duty implicit in the law of civil obligation at the expense
of private autonomy and individual freedom of contract." Comment, Once More into the
Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Damage Doctrine, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 559, 576
(1970). 0
4. Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365 (1921).
5. Id. at 367.
6. Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 576, 599 (1969). See also G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRAcr 142 n.247 (1974).
Vol. 17: 3-4
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definition mainly in the law of contract, and quite naturally in the
temper of the time the law of contract dominated the nineteenth
century legal order."' 7 Freedom of Contract was a watchword of the
era, and so was judicial non-intervention: the freedom of the parties
to compose the terms of their agreement would be abridged if judges
were to go beyond enforcement of exact words." And when the eco-
nomic picture, the prevailing political philosophy, and the national
temper changed, there were concomitant changes in the law of con-
tract. That is why contract cases from the turn of the cen-
tury-particularly cases about unforeseen circumstances-reveal so
much about the chameleon concept of Freedom of Contract and its
meaning in America.
Impossibility cases are a special breed of contract law. They in-
volve the situation where the parties did not expressly provide in
their agreement for a contingency that subsequently rendered per-
formance impossible. Early in the nineteenth century, such a con-
tingency was no ground for an exception to the contract. In the.
name of Freedom of Contract the exact terms were upheld, on the
theory that the written contract was an expression of the mutual
intention of the parties.' But mutual intent is not always best ho-
7. Farnsworth, supra note 6, at 599, quoting J. HURST, LAw AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915, at 285 (1964). See also A.
MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM 19 (1968); F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE,
CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 2-5 (1974); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 640 (1943).
8. But few words have exact meanings, and literal enforcement does not necessarily effec-
tuate the parties' intent. Judicial literalness, in the end, seems to reflect a laissez-faire
ideology among judges.
The early common-law view that a party is legally obligated to perform his contract
notwithstanding a drastic change of conditions between the time the contract was
made and the time that performance was due reflects a high-water mark of freedom
of contract of a sort. Parties to an agreement were free to make such promises as they
wished, but they did so at the peril of strict enforcement by the courts despite a later
unanticipated change of circumstances. The theory was that since the parties had
freely made their contract, they must perform it. This "let the chips fall where they
may" philosophy is embodied in the ancient Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda, i.e.,
contracts must be performed. Enforcement was always, in theory at least, tempered
by the necessity of first interpreting the promise before enforcing it. But in the early
law the canons of interpretation of language were literal and rigid, as though words
had a single and constant meaning irrespective of the time and context in which they
were used.
H. SHEPHERD & B. SHER, LAW IN SociETY 450 (1960). See also H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF
PRIVATE CONTRACT 95 (1961); Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good
Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REv. 401, 409 (1964).
9. The general rule was that:
1978-79
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nored by literalism; this theory had another source and served an-
other function: judges steeped in laissez-faire were unwilling to
meddle with contracts by bringing in policy considerations. They
thereby injected their own "hands off" philosophy into contract
decisions. 0 Then there was a "virtual volte-face in the law": an
exceptive doctrine excusing non-performance of impossible contrac-
tual obligations budded and bloomed." Impossibility cases from the
turn of the century yield a graphic depiction of law developing; they
beat with the pulse of America then. For the doctrine of impossibil-
ity has been like a cartilaginous plate persisting between the shaft
of bone and its extremities, thickening in conjunction with the bone
until entirely replaced by it at adult length.
To realize that "impossibility" is a word with a background of
fixed legalistic responses, and to understand and appreciate its
use, by the court and the lawyers alike, as a dialectic instru-
[Olne, who makes a positive agreement to do a lawful act, is not absolved from
liability for a failure to fulfill his covenant by a subsequent impossibility of perform-
ance .. , because he voluntarily contracts to perform it without any reservation or
exception, which, if he desired, he could make in his agreement . . . . [Wihile courts
may enforce, they may not avoid, such contracts ....
Berg v. Erickson, 234 F. 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1916) (emphasis added). See also St. Joseph Hay
& Feed Co. v. Brewster, 195 S.W. 71 (1917); Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. Stanton,
227 Pa. 55, 63 (1910); Mitchell v. Hancock County, 91 Miss. 414, 45 S. 571, 572 (1908);
Cutcliffe v. McAnnally, 88 Ala. 507, 7 S. 331 (1890); Lawing v. Rintles, 97 N.C. 350, 2 S.E.
252, 254 (1887); Adams v. Nichols, 36 Mass. 275, 276 (1837).
In the nineteenth century the conception of liability as resting on intention was put
in metaphysical rather than ethical form. Law was a realization of the idea of liberty,
and existed to bring about the widest possible individual liberty. Liberty was the free
will in action. Hence it was the business of the legal order to give the widest effect to
the declared will and to impose no duties except in order to effectuate the will or to
reconcile the will of one with the will of others by a universal law.
R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 79 (rev. ed. 1954). The important
institution, Pound explained, "was a right of free exchange and free contract, deduced from
the law of equal freedom as a sort of freedom of economic motion and locomotion." Id. at
149.
10. Two points can be made here: 1) while literal reading of contracts is consistent with
laissez-faire, it does not necessarily best effect the intention of the parties. 2) A judge who
tries to keep his own ideas out of people's contracts may in fact be expressing a personal socio-
political philosophy of laissez-faire.
11. Comment, Supervening Impossibility of Performance as a Defense, 5 FORDHAM L. REV.
322, 323 (1936). See also Rothschild, The Doctrine of Frustration or Implied Condition in the
Law of Contracts, 6 TEMPLE L.Q. 337, 339 (1932); Page, The Development of the Doctrine of
Impossibility of Performance, 18 MIcH. L. REV. 589, 613-14 (1920).
12. Smith, Some Practical Aspects of the Doctrine of Impossibility, 32 ILL. L. REV. 672,
684 n.54 (1938).
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ment which promotes the acceptance and unfolding of new
concepts demanded by a developing social order, is to recognize
its function and to sympathize with the doctrine in all of its
cloudy vigor.' 3
We shall monitor judicial responses to impossibility situations in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 4 to chart the
development of contract law as a reflection of those times, and to
see what became of the notion of Freedom of Contract.
THE STRICT APPLICATION OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
An 1859 New Jersey case 5 displays the literal version of Freedom
of Contract in full force. Evernham and Hill had covenanted to
"build, erect and complete"'" a school-house on a particular lot for
a sum of money. The first time up, the partially erected building
could not stand against a gale of wind; the second time, it fell due
to a "latent defect in the soil."' 7 When the builders refused to try
13. Id. at 684.
14. "Freedom of Contract" typically evokes thoughts of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), and other substantive due process cases involving individual liberty under the
fourteenth amendment. Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), is also cited in this
connection. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 60. Our focus, however, will be limited to cases that
rarely reached the United States Supreme Court. Traditional constitutional histories gener-
ally magnify atypical "great cases" that are "unrepresentative either as intellectual history
or as examples of social control." M. HoRowrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERCAN LAw 1780-
1860, at xii (1977).
Indeed, constitutional law in America represents episodic legal intervention buttressed
by a rhetorical tradition that is often an unreliable guide to the slower (and often more
unconscious) processes of legal change in America.
But another, more crucial, distortion has been introduced by the excessive equation
of constitutional law with "law" . . . . [T]he study of constitutional law focuses
historians on the nay-saying function of law and, more specifically, on the rather
special circumstances of judicial intervention into statutory control. Yet judicial pro-
mulgation and enforcement of common law rules constituted an infinitely more typical
pattern of the use of law throughout mot of the nineteenth century. By thus focusing
on private law we can study the more regular instances in which law, economy, and
society interacted.
Id. The thought is that dusting off Regional Reporters from the turn of the century will yield
greater understanding of contract theories than pouring through casebooks on Constitutional
Law.
15. Superintendent and Trustees of Public Schools of Trenton v. Bennett, 3 Dutcher 513,
72 Am. Dec. 373 (1859).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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again, the Superintendent and Trustees of the Public Schools of
Trenton sued to recover several pre-paid installments.
Justice Whelpley considered the question of where the loss should
fall and applied the "firmly established" rule of Paradine v. Jane:8
18. [1647] Aleyn, 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897. A strict interpretation of the Paradine case has
often led to "absurd results" as in Hills v. Sughrue, [1846] 15 M. & W. 252, where the owner
of a ship was held liable for breach of a covenant to load guano at Ichaboe, even though his
failure to so load was due to a lack of guano in all of Ichaboe. Conlen, supra note 2, at 30.
Paradine v. Jane involved a suit in debt, where the plaintiff claimed that three years' back
rent was owing. The defense was that a German prince-Rupert, "an alien born, enemy to
the King and kingdom,"-had invaded the realm With a hostile army, forcibly seized posses-
sion of the leasehold, and expelled the lessee. The court upheld the plaintiff's demurrer "for
though the whole army had been alien enemies, yet he ought to pay his rent."
And this difference was taken, that where the law creates a duty or charge, and the
party is disabled to perform it without any default in him, and hath no remedy over,
there the law will excuse him. As in the case of waste, if a house be destroyed by
tempest, or by enemies, the lessee is excused. ... [B]ut when the party by his own
contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may,
notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided
against it by his contract. And therefore if the lessee covenant to repair a house, though
it be burnt by lightning, or thrown down by enemies, yet he ought to repair it.
[1647] Aleyn, 26, 82 Eng. Rep. at 897. The leasehold arrangement gave rise to obligations
at law, which might be discharged by supervening occurrences; however, the duty to pay rent
grew out of a covenant between the parties and was thus indissoluble.
It has become something of a sport to pierce the obiter dictum veil of Paradine:
[T]his well-known case, which has been cited innumerable times is not a case of
impossibility of performance at all since the performance of the defendant (paying the
rent) was not impossible. Rather, it was a case of frustration of purpose . . . .Yet,
the language of the opinion . . _has been inaccurately applied on occasion to cases
involving impossibility. Thus . [it] . ..must be considered an unreliable preced-
ent.
J. MURRAY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNrRAcTs 1017 (1969). See also Page, supra note
11, at 595-96; 6 A. CORBIN, CoaBN ON CONTRACTS § 1322 (1962); Krause v. Bd. of Trustees of
School Town of Crothersville, 162 Ind. 278, 70 N.E. 264, '265 (1904).
Gilmore offers two interpretations of Paradine. 1) The seventeenth century court decided
the case on a procedural ground, not allowing the tenant to interpose his plea in the landlord's
action for rent, but not foreclosing him from bringing an independent action against the
landlord to recover damages resulting from his expulsion by Prince Rupert. See Monk v.
Cooper, 2 Strange, 763, 93 Eng. Rep. 833 (K.B. 1723); 2) The court viewed the leasehold as a
fully executed transaction: the landlord had conveyed the leasehold interest to the defendant
tenant, who then bore the risk of loss or destruction like a buyer of chattels after delivery. G.
GILMoRE, THE DEATH o CoNTRAcT 45-46 (1974).
Whatever the true intent of the Paradine court, the case had often been cited for the
proposition "if a contract was made to perform an act at a future time, and no exception
stated, persons so contracting would be liable for non-performance even though an interven-
ing vent [sic]1-even an act of God-prevented performance. ... Conlen, supra note 2,
at 29. This development of Paradine into a principle of absolute contract reflects the
"individualistic philosophic" notions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Smith,
supra note 12, at 672-73. See SHEPHERD & SHER, supra note 8, at 452, where the editors state
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one who takes on a contractual duty is bound to make it good,
"notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he
might have provided against it by his contract .. . ."I' The court
endorsed this view, regardless of its occasional harsh or apparently
unjust results, for "it has its foundations in good sense and inflexible
honesty. He that agrees to do an act should do it unless absolutely
impossible."20 Because people are free to write contracts as they
wish, they should not later be excused from performance by an
unprovided-for contingency. Justice Whelpley therefore felt that he
could do no more than take the contract at face value:
[T]he law will not insert, for the benefit of one of the parties,
by construction, an exception which the parties have not, ei-
ther by design or neglect, inserted in their engagement. If a
party, for sufficient consideration, agrees to erect and complete
a building upon a particular spot, and find all the materials
and do all the labor, he must erect and complete it, because
he has agreed to do so."
The Justice found no impossibility of performance under these facts
and shunning "nice philosophical disquisitions, whether the owner
or the builder shall bear the loss," held that the defense of the
builders had been properly overruled. The loss was to be borne by
the defendants, guarantors of Evernham and Hill.
Strict Freedom of Contract was also championed in School Dis-
trict No. 1 v. Dauchy, 1 decided by the high court of Connecticut in
that the Paradine "rule" accurately represents the prevailing legal philosophy of that time:
contracting parties alone could provide for subsequent changes of circumstances that would
excuse performance; reviewing courts should treat contractual terms as absolute.
19. 72 Am. Dec. at 374.
20. Id. at 375.
21. Id. at 376. The effect of such a ruling is that the builder would pay damages for not
erecting and completing the building. A specific performance decree in such a case was
unlikely, and if one were issued, the parties would probably settle the case on the basis of it.
22. Id. at 377.
23. 25 Conn. 530, 68 Am. Dec. 371 (1857).
In THE DEATH OF CoNTRAr, Gilmore speaks of a "series of American cases" involving
building or construction contracts "in which the recurrent situation was that the structure,
having been almost completed, was blown down or burnt down or sank into the mud.
GiLMORE, supra note 18, at 77-78.
Citing Nichols, Dauchy, Bennett, and Stees, he explains that these were all pre-insurance
cases, with the owner suing the builder. Id. at 78 & 138 n.200.
The apparent meaning of the cases is that the unhappy builder must go on building,
no matter how many times the structure collapses, all for the originally agreed contract
1978-79
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1857. A school-house being constructed under a contract similar to
Bennett's was struck by lightning when nearly completed, and fire
consumed it. The contractor rejected the school district's offer of
additional time and refused to rebuild, thus incurring a suit in
assumpsit. A jury verdict for the defendant was overturned.
The court noted that only in a few instances were departures from
exact contractual terms allowable;"4 contractors bind themselves
absolutely and unqualifiedly. Even an Act of God would not excuse
performance without judicial scrutiny:
The act of God will excuse the not doing of a thing where the
law had created the duty, but never where it is created by the
positive and absolute contract of the party. The reason of this
distinction is obvious. The law never creates or imposes upon
any one a duty to perform what God forbids or what he renders
impossible of performance, but it allows people to enter into
contracts as they please, provided they do not violate the law."5
price-or pay damages for not doing so. On closer examination, however, it turns out
that all that was involved in the cases was the recovery of down payments or progress
payments made by the owner in course of construction-a result which might be
described as a form of loss-sharing.
Id. at 78. Does insurance then explain these cases? Certainly it did not soften the strict
Freedom of Contract judicial rhetoric, nor the impact of this hard-line language on builders
about to enter contracts.
24. Justice Ellsworth gave the examples of a marriage agreement *which was impliedly
conditioned upon continued life for the enfianced couple, or the promise to deliver a horse at
a day in the future which was impliedly conditioned on the horse still being alive. The Justice
saw these cases as instances where the intention of the parties is "presumed or inferred" from
the situation or from the subject matter, rather than as exceptions to the strict rule of literal
adherence to contract. 25 Conn. at 536, 68 Am. Dec. at 372.
25. Id.
Matousek v. Galligan, 104 Neb. 731, 178 N. W. 510 (1920) offers this definition: An 'act
of God' is a part of every contract," and "must be an act or occurrence so extraordinary and
unprecedented that human foresight could not foresee or guard against it." Id. at 510. In
Meriwether v. Lowndes County, 89 Ala. 362 (1889), counsel for the defendant argued that a
given flood was an act of God because it was sudden, extraordinary, unexpected and 'greater
and more destructive than had ever before happened in the memory of the oldest inhabit-
ant."' Id. at 365. Some courts have distinguished act of God from unavoidable accidents. See
Berg v. Erickson, 234 F. 817 (8th Cir. 1916).
According to Williston: "The effect of the destruction of the subject-matter of the contract,
or of the means of performance, is the same when caused by the voluntary or malicious act
of a third person as when caused by act of God." 18 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 1936 (3d ed. 1978). See Page, supra note 11, at 592-93 (courts have ignored the distinction
between human agency and act of God wherever the distinction would have produced any
legal consequences).
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Thus, people were free to bind themselves by inviolate obligations;
no legal duty was any stronger. The court held, under the authority
of Paradine v. Jane, that parties to a contract must perform
"notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity. ' 26
In Stees v. Leonard the banner of Freedom of Contract was
likewise unfurled. The defendants had agreed to erect, build and
complete a three story business house on a particular spot, for a set
price, by a certain date. The structure collapsed just when the de-
Comment c to § 457 of the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS says that the terms "act of God"
and "vis major" (force majeure) are misleading when used in reference to ordinary contrac-
tual duties. Their use now is mainly in the law of carriers. Corbin has this to say:
It may be that in former times men supposed themselves to be able to see the hand of
the Almighty in the occurrences about them; today, the phrase is out of fashion as a
mode of determining when to throw the risk upon a promisee, rather than a promisor.
Other phrases, particularly in a foreign language, have also been used. A promisor has
been said to be discharged in case the promised performance was prevented by vis
major or by force majeure, depending upon a preference for Latin or for French. These
phrases, too serve no useful purpose as a test of responsibility, although they are
catchwords that may occasionally be convenient to describe the facts that lead a court
to decide in favor of the promisor.
6 CoaIN ON CONTRACTS § 1324 (1962).
One court has suggested that we cannot hope for more than a fuzzy conception of act of
God, noting that it is an event which the parties could not foresee or control, with a changing
definition depending upon the nature and construction of the particular contract. Krause v.
Bd. of Trustees of School Town of Crothersville, 162 Ind. 278, 70 N.E. 264, 265-66 (1904).
In St. Joseph Hay & Feed Co. v. Brewster, 195 S.W. 71 (1917), Justice Trimble set forth
the general rule that those who make agreements are thereby bound regardless of unforeseen
circumstances. As an exception to this "old and well-established" rule, he mentioned the
situation where particular property is destroyed by "what is commonly called an act of God
... .[T]hen the destruction of such property excuses performances." (Recall Justice Ells-
worth's marriage and horse examples in Dauchy). Justice Trimble then went on to state,
however, that it was not accurate to say that an unavoidable contingency had absolved the
promisor from his obligation; rather it should be said that "the contract was not in reality
an absolute contract binding him to performance under all circumstances, but only to per-
form under certain circumstances and conditions .... " Id. at 72. Justice Trimble and
Justice Ellsworth seem to have been one on this matter, for in Dauchy, the Connecticut juror
allowed that in some cases an act of God might "render" performance impossible-as when
a lessee covenants to leave a wood in a good plight and the trees are blown down in a tempest,
or when one covenants to serve another for seven years and dies before the expiration of the
term. In both cases, said the Justice, performance is defeated by the act of God. But he could
not resist adding: "I should rather say, because it is implied that the thing shall exist or life
be prolonged, or else the contract of course can not be broken." 68 Am. Dec. at 373. To
nineteenth century courts, flying the standard of Freedom of Contract and concerned with
holding people to their promises, an act of God that would relegate a contract to the realm
of impossibility was an extreme and extraordinary occurrence which was not at all likely to
happen with any regularity.
26. 68 Am. Dec. at 374.
27. 20 Minn. 448 (1874).
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sired height was attained. Rebuilt to the same height, once again it
fell, whereupon the defendants abandoned the work and "refused to
perform the contract."2 A jury awarded the plaintiffs return of their
progress payments and compensation for lost use of their lot and
damage to their adjacent house. The spot was a quagmire, the soil
loose, spongy, porous and soft, but that was unimportant to the jury
or the court.
The Minnesota appellate court affirmed this jury verdict and
enforced "the contract as the parties themselves have made it,"29
stating that the law would not relieve persons from improvident
contracts. Resting its decision on Bennett and Dauchy, the court
held that draining the land (a necessary act for completion of the
building) fell to the builders: "Whatever was necessary to be done
in order to complete the building, they were bound by the contract
to do."' 30 Having been free to contract as they pleased, they could
not later be heard to deny the absoluteness of their agreement, even
to prevent extreme consequences from being visited upon them.
Performance was not excused.
These three cases present Freedom of Contract as something sa-
cred-a cherished ideal, which lent emotional fervor to judicial rhet-
oric. Freedom of Contract in the early nineteenth century, perhaps
partially because of its sanctity, was also an inflexible rule of con-
tract enforcement, extremely literal in application, often resulting
in harsh (sometimes absurd) consequences. At a time when "hands
off" was the accepted official position of government, judges han-
dled contracts almost mechanically-looking only to the words that
the parties had chosen. This was, perhaps, not the best way to
effectuate what the parties intended, but it was the approach most
in keeping with the laissez-faire temper of the age-government and
courts alike were to be held at bay. As the parties wrote their con-
tracts, so were they bound; the terms of their agreements, having
been freely chosen were to be strictly enforced in the name of Free-
dom of Contract.
28. Id. at 449.
29. Id. at 451.
30. Id. at 455.
31. Id. at 451.
t564 Vol. 17: 3-4
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THE AMERICAN REPAIR DOCTRINE
The celebrated case of Butterfield v. Byron2 represents a counter-
point to the hard-line Freedom of Contract approach-the Ameri-
can Repair Doctrine. Byron agreed to "make, erect, and finish in a
good substantial, and workmanlike manner, a three and one half
story frame hotel" by May 20, 1889. Butterfield agreed to pay
$8,500 for the structure, and to do the grading, excavating, stone-
work, brickwork, painting, and plumbing. The time for completion
was subsequently extended to June 10, 1889, but on May 25th a bolt
of lightning struck the partially completed building, causing it to
burn to the ground. Thereafter, no further work was done. Although
Butterfield collected insurance to the tune of $6,914.08, he sued on
the contract for breach. Verdict was directed in favor of Byron by
the trial judge.
Justice Knowlton conceded that it was well-established that when
one contracts to build a structure on the land of another, complete
with labor and materials, there is no excuse from performance.
However, when the building is not wholly the responsibility of the
builder-"as where repairs are to be made on the property of an-
other"-there is an implied condition that the building shall con-
tinue in existence: "the destruction of it without the fault of either
of the parties will excuse performance of the contract, and leave no
right of recovery of damages in favor of either against the other." 4
Because Byron had not agreed to build a complete house and fur-
nish all the materials and labor, his contractwas "of a very different
kind."
Immediately before the fire, when the house was nearly com-
pleted, the defendant's contract, so far as it remained unper-
formed, was to finish a house on the plaintiffs land, which had
been constructed from materials and by labor furnished in part
by the plaintiff and in part by himself. He was no more respon-
sible that the house should continue in existence than the
plaintiff was. Looking at the situation of the parties at that
time, it was like a contract to make repairs on the house of
another. His undertaking and duty to go on and finish the work
32. 153 Mass. 517 (1890).
33. Id. at 518.
34. Id. at 519.
35. Id. at 528.
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was upon an implied condition that the house, the product of
their joint contributions, should remain in existence. The de-
struction of it by fire discharged him from his contract. 6
Accordingly, the court ruled that Butterfield could sue for money
had and received (payments already made to Byron), and that
Byron could sue on implied assumpsit (for work done and materials
supplied). To effect these findings, the verdict was set aside and
Byron was given leave to file a declaration in set-off.
This case illustrates the more active role taken by courts in im-
possibility cases near 1900. Justice Whelpley from Bennett would
not have gone so far to imply a condition and "interpret" the con-
tract in the way that Justice Knowlton did in Butterfield. A Free-
dom of Contract approach from the early nineteenth century would
have required Byron to fulfill the absolute promises to which he had
voluntarily bound himself-in spite of thunderbolts from the sky.
An 1891 court was not about to force such an interpretation.
The American Repair Doctrine, which flourished in the last de-
cades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twen-
tieth, distinguished (on implication, by assumed intent) contracts
for the repair of existing' structures from those for the erection and
completion of totally new structures. Or, more accurately, it distin-
guished contracts where the owner and the builder were to share the
labor from those where the builder assumed full responsibility for
the creation of a completed building. Thus, the court in Goldfarb
v. Cohen37 said that the rule in Dauchy did not apply to a contract
for work upon an existing structure that was already the property
of the employer; continued existence was essential to the full per-
formance of the work and was, therefore, an implied condition.31
Eventually the Repair Doctrine was expanded to include subcon-
tractor's work on structures just being constructed. As technology
advanced, the builder who built the whole house disappeared; "the
heating contractor, the plumbing contractor; the electrical contrac-
36. Id.
37. 92 Conn. 277, 102 A. 649 (1917).
38. See 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1337 (1962); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1965 (1924);
Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 111. 18, 22-23 (1867); Cook v. McCabe, 53 Wis. 250, 10 N.W. 507,
509 (1881). See also Carroll v. Bowerstock, 100 Kan. 270, 164 P. 143, 144 (1917) (rejection of
the idea that the owner warrants continued existence of the house); 14 MINN. L. REV. 1038,
104 n.16 (1929) (one court found that owner impliedly agreed to keep structure in existence);
3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1976 (1924) (owner under no such obligation).
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tor and so on were all safely sheltered under the repair doctrine
.... ,"31 The early nineteenth century absolutist notion of Freedom
of Contract had faded too, leaving a trail of disaster cases with harsh
outcomes as evidence that it had once been so strict. On into the
twentieth century, laissez-faire was no longer the watchword; Free-
dom of Contract came to mean something other than literal applica-
tion of contractual language, and the judicial function was more
positive than it had been for decades.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL THEORY
The 1880's and 1890's were a time of ignition for an "Age of
Energy."40 In response to the industrially expansive and politically
conservative post-Civil War era, the Populist-Progressive reform
spirit came like fresh air, sounding the death knell for the passive
Spencerian Social Darwinist ideology. As the "conservative chain of
ideas" dissolved, new ideas and new methods emerged.4' A genera-
tion of dreamers and reformers came of age in the last decade of the
nineteenth century, opening the way for purposeful, directed action,
striving to realize through their efforts the promise of America.
The Social Gospel movement, spearheaded by Walter Rauschen-
busch, prompted ministers to organize groups to support peace,
temperance, interdenominationalism and political socialism. This
emerging religious philosophy preached that human endeavor could
aid in the establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth.2 Ameri-
cans of that day read utopian novels with gusto,4 3 dreaming of a
better nation than they had yet attained; and yet, they were prag-
matists as well. William James, the psychologist-philosopher author
of Essays in Pragmatism, became very popular at the turn of the
century. People also listened attentively to Richard Ely's "new eco-
nomics"-regarding the state as an agency of positive assistance to
further human progress." There was general insistence that govern-
39. THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 78-79.
40. H. JONES, THE AGE OF ENERGY (1970).
41. E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 66 (1955).
42. See W. RAUSCHENBUSCH, CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS (1907).
43. E.g., E. BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD (1887); I. DONNALLY, CAESAR'S COLUMN (1890);
W. D. HOWELLS, A TRAVELER FROM ALTRURIA (n.d.).
44. P. BOLLER, AMERICAN THOUGHT IN TRANSITION: THE IMPACT OF EVOLUTIONARY
NATURALISM, 1865-1900, at 84 (1969).
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ment be more responsive to social ills and inequalities. 5
At the turn of the twentieth century, America was poised between
ideals of the past-a rural America of community and shared feel-
ing;4" realities of the present-industrial strikes, economic depres-
sions, entanglements ovetseas in Manila and elsewhere, increased
urbanization; and hopes for the future-to harness a new technology
in service of both spiritual and material progress.47 The myth of
American newness, born with the nation, persisted. "With stren-
uous application of the energy of free men, Americans would get
there . .. ,48
We have seen that the legal counterpart to political laissez-faire
was a literal version of Freedom of Contract.49 Each of these ideas
was a "passionate exhortation to allow the free development of the
individual, and to permit production and trade to follow their natu-
ral channels unimpeded. It was a cry for freedom."5 Turn-of-the-
century judges reflected the shedding of this ideology in their ap-
proach to decision-making, and developments in the law wended
the way of the changing dynamic of society:
As we look back on the nineteenth century theories, we are
45. See W. LIPPMANN, DrFT AND MASTERY (1914); H. CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN
LIFE (1909).
46. "Industrialism had broken the cake of custom, destroying the old, flexible, local
apparatus of community." Brebner, Laissez-Faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth-
Century Britain, J. ECON. HIST. Supp. VIII, at 59 (1948).
.47. See C. SANFORD, THE QUEST FOR PARADISE (1959).
48. R. WALKER, LIFE IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 206 (1967).
49. "Contractualism" in the law is the ideal theory that all obligation would arise out of
the will of the individual contracting freely-a theory rested not only on the classical will
theory of contract but also on the "political doctrine that all restraint is evil and that the
government is best which governs least." Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553,
558 (1933). According to Cohen, the underpinnings of Freedom of Contract were economic:
freedom to make agreements would lead to more individual initiative and greater wealth for
the nation; sociophilosophical: each person would contract for that which would bring plea-
sure and there would be the greatest happiness for the greatest number a la Bentham;
biological: the strong would be naturally selected our and the fittest would survive the rigors
of life in this world. Id. at 562-63. See T. GREEN, WORKS, 3 MISCELLANIES AND MEMOIRS, at
372 (1888) (individual freedom would lead to "the liberation of the powers of all men equally
for contributions to a common good.")
50. WILLISTON, supra note 4, at 366. See also Pound, The End of Law as Developed in
Juristic Thought, 30 HARV. L. REV. 201, 203 (1917):
Thus the conception of the end of law as an unshackling of individual energy, as an
insuring of the maximum of individual free self-assertion, gave rise to a conception of
the function of law as a purely negative one of removing or preventing obstacles to such
individual self-assertion, not a positive one of directly furthering social progress.
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struck most of all, I think, by the narrow scope of social duty
which they implicitly assumed. No man is his brother's keeper;
the race is to the swift; let the devil take the hindmost. For
good or ill, we have changed all that. . . .The decline and fall
of the general theory of contract and, in most quarters, of
laissez-faire economics may be taken as remote reflections of
the transition from nineteenth century individualism to the
welfare state and beyond.'
This transformation is also seen in legal theory. In 1908, Roscoe
Pound was calling for a "pragmatic, a sociological legal science"
which would bring pragmatism into law so that human conditions
would govern legal conceptions and logic would be relegated to its
"true position as an instrument. '52 And Oliver Wendell Holmes'
prediction theory of law emphasized the role of the judge as law
maker.53 By that time, it was undisputed that courts should do more
than keep their hands off by enforcing the literal terms of contrac-
tual arrangements. As judges accepted the spirit of their age, they
created new tools for intervention. In the contract law of impossibil-
ity, they expanded use of implied conditions, loosely tied not only
to intent, but also to equity and justice.
THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
That the period from 1880 to 1920 was an Age of Energy is borne
out by the impossibility cases of that era. The very idea of impossi-
bility was transformed, and creative theories were forged on the
anvil of Freedom of Contract. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard5 4
is important for the light it sheds on these changes. The Mineral
Park Land Company had made a contract with public authorities
to construct a concrete bridge across a ravine. To that end, the Land
Company entered into a contract with Howard, who owned land
nearby. Howard was to grant the right to haul gravel and earth
from his land; the Land Company was to take from his land all of
the gravel and earth needed for fill and cement work on the bridge,
51. THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 6, at 95-96.
52. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609-10 (1908). See also
Pound, supra note 50, at 225.
53. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
54. 172 Cal. 289 (1916).
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estimated at approximately 114,000 cubic yards. As it happened,
the Land Company took only 50,131 cubic yards from Howard's
land (and 50,869 from another place). Howard brought suit to re-
cover the balance for the gravel and earth taken and to recover
damages for failure to take the rest. The defendant responded that
it had taken all the earth and gravel "available for the work men-
tioned" 55-all that was above water level. The trial court found the
contract absolute and held the Land Company to performance, but
the California Supreme Court reversed, based upon an expanded
definition of impossibility.
According to the appellate court, the parties had contracted "for
the right to take earth and gravel to be used in the construction of
the bridge:""6
When they stipulated that all of the earth and gravel needed
for this purpose should be taken from plaintiff's land, they
contemplated and assumed that the land contained the requi-
site quantity available for use. The defendants were not bind-
ing themselves to take what was not there. And, in determining
whether the earth and gravel were "available" we must view
the conditions in a practical and reasonable way. Although
there was gravel on the land, it was so situated that the defen-
dants could not take it by ordinary means, nor except at a
prohibitive cost. To all fair intents then, it was impossible for
the defendants to take it.57
Thus, the California court in 1916 invoked a somewhat softer rule
than that dictated by a strict Freedom of Contract approach; even
if gravel were present, it had to be "available for use" or perform-
ance was deemed impossible." Impossibility, formerly such an ex-
treme circumstance that not even an Act of God would qualify, now
occurred where a promisor had to employ extraordinary means and
confronted prohibitive costs.59
55. Id. at 291.
56. Id. at 293.
57. Id.
58. Recovery was accordingly denied on the damages count. On the count for the balance
of money owed, judgment for the plaintiff, Howard, was summarily upheld.
As to the significance of the "available gravel" extension, see 4 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 409
(1916). See also WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1963 (1920).
59. Traditionally, increased costs have been no ground for excuse of performance. In the
case of Leavitt v. Dover, 67 N.H. 94, 32 A. 156 (1892), the plaintiff had agreed to construct
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two wells for the defendant for the sum of $10,500. But after the well had been sunk to the
depth required, which was accomplished with difficulty because of quicksand a short distance
below the surface and the moist condition of the ground itself, the curb gave way and the
ground caved in, rendering valueless all that had been done up to that time. Finding that
the contract had been voluntarily made and that the caving-in of earth had only rendered
performance more expensive, not impossible, the court required the defendant to make the
contract good.
See also International Paper Co. v. Rockefeller, 161 App. Div. 180, 146 N.Y.S. 371 (1914)
("The defendant is not excused from delivering the live spruce suitable for pulpwood which
survived the fire by the mere fact that its location upon the tract is such that it would be
very expensive for him to deliver it."); Straus v. Kazemekas, 100 Conn. 581, 594, 124 A. 234,
239 (1924) (if nature of performance is not impossible, the new fact that it has become
difficult or unprofitable is no defense).
No American case has apparently considered the question of increased cost as in any
degree an available defense, no matter how enormous or extravagant, and in the
consideration of what may defeat the objects of the parties, the pendulum would seem
to swing backward and forward.
Conlen, supra note 2, at 92 (emphasis added).
Williston agreed that increased expense or difficulty caused supervening circumstances, or
decrease in value of counterperformance, will not ordinarily excuse the promisor. He ques-
tioned the correctness of this principle, since a very great increase in expense may involve
something very different from what the parties contemplated. 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
1963 (1920). Corbin mentioned a few cases indicating that unexpected difficulty or expense
may be so extreme that a court will discharge the parties on the ground of practical impossi-
bility. 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1333 (1962).
Recently, courts have been more amenable to viewing extreme hardship as an excuse of
performance. See Berman, Excuse for Non-performance in the Light of Contract Practices
in International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1418 (1963); Savage v. Peter Kiewit Sons'
Co., 432 P.2d 519 (Ore. 1967); Whelan v. Griffith Consumers Co., 170 A.2d 229 (1961);
Schmeltzer v. Gregory, 72 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1968).
The Uniform Commercial Code has adopted the doctrine of commercial impracticability
rather than strict impossibility with regard to contracts involving sales of goods.
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation ... (a) Delay in
delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller. . . is not a breach of his duty
under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable
foreign or domestic government regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be
invalid.
U.C.C. § 2-615.
Comment 4 of § 2-615 leaves room for liberalization:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some
unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither
is a rise or a collapse in the market itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of
business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.
See Comment, Commercial Impracticability and Intent in UCC Section 2-615: A
Reconciliation, 9 CONN. L. REv. 266 (1977), and Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The
Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 119 (1977) for insightful
analysis of commercial impracticability under the U.C.C.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS takes the U.C.C. impracticability approach:
The rationale behind the doctrines of impracticability and frustration is sometimes
said to be that there is an "implied term" of the contract that such extraordinary
1978-79
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Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard declared: 'A thing is impossi-
ble in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is
impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unrea-
sonable cost."'' 9 The case reveals a widening of the exceptive doc-
trine. To the Bennett, Dauchy, and Stees courts, "impossible"
meant that a thing could not by any means be accomplished; to the
Howard court of 1916, it meant that performance would be diffi-
cult."' The concept of impossibility had opened to include impracti-
cability as an unexpungeable facet.
When the first Restatement of Contracts was drafted in 1932, the
American Law Institute embraced this more liberal notion of impos-
sibility, defining it as "not only strict impossibility but impractica-
bility because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, in-
circumstances will not occur. This Restatement rejects this analysis in favor of that of
the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615, under which the central inquiry is whether the
non-occurrence of the circumstances was a "basic assumption on which the contract
was made" ....
Determining whether the non-occurrence of a particular event was or was not a basic
assumption involves a judgment as to which party assumed the risk of its occurrence
... . If . . . a disaster results in an abrupt tenfold increase in cost to the seller, a
court might determine that the seller did not assume this risk by concluding that the
non-occurrence of the disaster was a "basic assumption" on which the contract was
made. In making such determinations, a court will look to all circumstances, including
the terms of the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note, 40-45 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974).
60. 172 Cal. at 293. Schmeltzer v. Gregory, 72 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1968), states that Howard
sets the modem trend relative to the definition of impracticability. But-see Annot., 84 A.L.R.
2d 12, 62 (1962) to the effect' that a survey of representative cases suggests that extreme
impracticability as amounting to impossibility "seems not to have been adopted very exten-
sively." Cf. C. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAw 530 n.2 (1976). For a criticism of the
unreasonably and excessively expensive-impracticable-impossible syllogism set forth in
Howard, see 4 CAIF L. REV. 407, 409 (1916).
61. In Bennett, the court said that if the covenant "be within the range of possibility,
however absurd or improbable the idea of execution may be, it will be upheld .... " See
also Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 Ill. 18, 22 (1967); Krause v. Bd. of Trustees of School Town of
Crothersville, 162 Ind. 278, 70 N.E. 246, 247 (1904).
In Vogt v. Hecker, 118 Wis. 306, 95 N.W. 90 (1903), the construction of a barn of prescribed
dimension was deemed delayed but possible when a violent storm blew it to the ground,
leaving only a few uprights standing. The court said that the contract called for a barn of
specific dimensions and characteristics, not "that barn of which the framework was blown
down, nor indeed, any particular barn." Id. at 91. But in Perlee v. Jeffcott, 89 N. J. Law 34,
97 A. 789 (1916), performance of a contract to convey a farm and premises was held to have
been made impossible by destruction of a barn because "both parties undoubtedly contem-
plated the conveyance of the buildings as an essential part of the premises." Id. at 36. As
Americans entered the twentieth century, the scope had expanded of things "impossible"
enough to excuse fulfillment of contractual obligations.
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jury or loss involved.""2 In a comment, the drafters suggested that
"impossible" be given a practical, rather than a scientifically exact,
meaning. "[I]mpracticability rather than absolute impossibility is
enough" but "[miere unanticipated difficulty . . . not amounting
to impracticability is not within the scope of this definition. ' 3 This
step was hailed in a 1936 law review comment:
Under a literal interpretation of the term it has been said that
impossibility exists when "the thing cannot by any means be
effected." This definition is too narrow. The broader definition
adopted by the American Law Institute, including impractica-
blility, is far more accurate under the decided cases. What
constitutes impracticability is a matter of degree."
The concept of impossibility had lost its absoluteness; courts had
more grounds on which to excuse performance.
It has been said that by the third decade of the twentieth century,
only a mere "husk of the rule" of Paradine v. Jane remained.65 Cases
from the turn of the century increasingly mentioned impractica-
62. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 454 (1932). Benjamin Cardozo had this to say about the
work of the American Law Institute:
The existence of this Institute is a declaration to the world that "laissez faire" in law
is going or has gone the way of "laissez faire" in economics.
A gospel of effort takes the place of a gospel that has vacillated between inaction
and despair. We will not sit by and refuse to do anything because the voice of pessi-
mism may remind us with labored demonstration that try as hard as we may, we shall
be unable to do everything. The changing mood reveals a changing outlook upon law,
and the processes and methods that develop and perfect it. Throw yourself back, they
used to tell us, upon the broad currents of history, and let the tide of the centuries
sweep you to your goal. This was comforting doctrine, and doctrine that the inertia
native to most of us made it pleasurable to follow, if only tide and current could be
trusted to do their share. The wisdom of the precept was not doubted till we found
ourselves sinking when the program required us to be floating, and doubt deepened
into certainty upon the discovery that instead of moving to a haven, we were sprawling
on the rocks. In one of these moments of discomfiture, this Institute was formed.
The American Law Institute, Address by B. N. Cardozo, Third Annual Meeting (May 1, 1925)
reprinted in LAW AND LrrERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES (1931).
63. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 454, Comment a (1932).
64. 5 FORDHAM L. REv. 322, 324 (1936).
It is apparent that the courts, influenced by collateral factors imposing hardship on
the promisor, have sometimes treated as impossible that which in fact remained possi-
ble of performance.
Id. at 325. See also Smith, supra note 12, at 676.
65. 34 YALE L.J. 91, 96 (1924). See also THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 6. "[liJt
is probable that the tendency of the law is toward an enlargement of the defense of impos-
sibility," wrote Williston in 1920. 3 W.uaSTON ON CONTRACTS § 1952 (1920).
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 17: 3-4
bility where parties claimed excuse from contractual obligations
because they could not perform." Reflecting this, Corbin noted in
his 1933 casebook that the term impossibility "is so loosely used
that it often means one or more of the following: Physical impossi-
bility (objective); personal inability (subjective); legal prohibition;
economic unprofitableness; difficulty and hardship; danger to life or
health.""7 The first of these, physical impossibility, had survived
from the early nineteenth century; but economic unprofitableness
and difficulty and hardship were definitely of twentieth century
vintage." In more cases than before, judges were deliberately allo-
cating the burdens caused by the happening of unexpected circum-
stances."
EXCEPTIONS TO THE STRIcT ENFORCEMENT THEORY
Early on, there were three exceptions to the pacta sunt servanda
(contracts must be performed) rule of contract law:
1) the death or illness of a person whose personal services were
promised;70
66. See, e.g., Cosden Oil & Gas Co. v. Moss, 267 P. 855 (Okla. Supr. Ct. 1928) (statement
that if literal performance becomes impracticable or impossible due to nonexistence of an
essential thing, performance will be excused, the terms "impracticable" and "impossible"
being of equal legal effect); Paxton Lumber Co. v. Panther Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 341, 98 S.E.
563 (1919) (noting an increasing tendency to afford promisors relief where great hardship
would ensue by forcing performance that is practically impossible); Isaacson v. Starrett, 56
Wash. 18, 104 P. 1115, 1116 (1909) (parties are bound to perform "unless the matter was at
the time manifestly and essentially impracticable). See also Bergman v. Parker, 216 A.2d 581
(D.C. Ct. App. 1965); Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
67. A. CORBIN, CASES ON CONTRACTS 690 n.18 (1933). See also 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§
1320, 1325 (1962); Smith, supra note 12, at 675-76.
68. SHEPHERD & SHER, supra note 8, at 450-51. "Impossibility" is a misnomer when
equated with physical impossibility, since changed circumstances rarely make performance
impossible in a literal sense. The more modern phrase "frustration of purpose" "reflects
merely an expanding concept of a common doctrine: the amelioration of hardship through
judicial allocation of unanticipated risk." Id. at 451. See also C. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CON-
TRACT LAW 524 (1976) (pure impossibility connotes an inability to perform; impracticability
combines or falls between the notions of frustration and impossibility).
69. The true distinction is not between difficulty and impossibility. As had been
seen a man may contract to do what is impossible, as well as what is difficult. The
important question is whether an unanticipated circumstance, the risk of which should
not fairly be thrown upon the promisor, has made performance of the promise vitally
different from what was reasonably to be expected.
3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1963 (1920).
70. The person may be the promisor or an agreed third person. 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 1940 (1920). See Lorillard v. Clyde, 142 N.Y. 456, 37 N.E. 489 (1894); Spalding v. Ross, 71
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2) change in the law by legislation or other official means, ren-
dering performance illegal;"
3) non-existence, destruction, or impairment of a specific thing
essential to performance.72
N.Y. 40, 27 Am. Rep. 7 (1877). Death of the employer or master would excuse performance if
a service was to be strictly personal to him. A. CoRnI, CASES ON CONTRACTS 704-05 n.22 (2d
ed. 1921). See Lacy v. Getman, 119 N.Y. 109, 23 N.E. 452 (1890); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 1941 (1920).
71. "Nonperformance creates no right to damages in case performance has been made
illegal by a change in the domestic law." CoRBN., supra note 70, at 709 n.24. See, e.g.,
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27, 160 S.W. 759 (1913); Baily v. De Crespigny, L.
R. 4 Q.B. 180 (1869). Corbin notes that a contractor takes the risk of impossibility due to
foreign law, Barker v. Hodgson, 105 Eng. Rep. 612 (K.B. 1814), but cites in opposition Texas
v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 (1921). But the Uniform Commercial Code has dis-
pensed with the distinction between foreign and domestic law. U.C.C. § 2-615(a).
72. This could be the subject matter of the contract or the means of performance:
Not only where a specific thing is itself to be sold or transferred, but wherever a
contract requires for its performance the existence of a specific thing, the fortuitous
destruction of that thing, or such impairment of it as makes it unavailable excuses the
promisor unless he has clearly assumed the risk of its continued existence. A contract
to manufacture goods in a particular factory is discharged by the destruction of the
factory; a contract to do work on a specific building is discharged by the destruction
of that building ....
3 WIiISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1946 (1920).
See, e.g., Nitro Powder Co. v. Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co., 233 N.Y. 294, 135
N.E. 507 (1922); Gouled v. Holwitz, 95 N.J.L. 277, 113 A. 323 (1921); Krause v. Bd. of
Trustees of School Town of Crothersville, 162 Ind. 278, 70 N.E. 264 (1904); Pinkham v.
Libbey, 93 Me. 575 (1900); Shear v. Wright, 60 Mich. 159, 26 N.W. 871 (1886); Cook v.
McCabe, 53 Wis. 250, 10 N.W. 507 (1881).
But see Perea v. Weld, 33 N.M. 445, 270 P. 884 (1928) (the undertaking of the parties was
absolute, but the subject matter of the contract was not the delivery of specific sheep which
were lost in a snowstorm; it was the delivery of "sheep of specific ages, sex and quality");
Vogt v. Hecker, 118 Wis. 396, 95 N.W. 90, 91 (1903) ("It was not that barn of which the
framework was blown down, nor indeed, any particular barn, which the plaintiff had con-
tracted to build, but a barn of specified description."); Jones v. United States, 96 U.S. 24
(1877) (contract could be satisfied by goods from any factory, so destruction of seller's factory
held to be no excuse). See 3 WILuSTON ON CONTRACTS § 1952 at 3314 & n.45 (1920).
The "specific thing" essential to the performance of the contract need not be yet in exist-
ence at the time of agreement between the parties. There is a line of crop cases in which this
is true. See, e.g., Squillante v. Calif. Lands, Inc., 5 Cal. App. 2d 89, 42 P.2d 81 (1935)
.(contract for 10 carloads of Zinfandel grapes of good quality, color, sugar content, from
specific vineyards); Gibbs v. Hersman, 73 Cal. 732, 239 P. 350, 351 (1st Dist. Cal. 1925)
(contracts for purchase and sale of wine grapes "suitable for Eastern shipment"); St. Joseph
Hay & Feed Co. v. Brewster, 195 S.W. 71 (Mo. App. 1917) (contract entered "with sole
reference to the defendant's crop"). See also Howell v. Coupland, [1876] 1 A.B. 258 (contract
for purchase and sale of 200 tons of regent potatoes grown on land owned by the defendant
at Shaplode); Matousek v. Galligan, 104 Neb. 731, 178 N. W. 510 (1920) (contract for sale of
specific, good, No. 1, merchantable, hay on defendant's land). However, an agreement to sell
a specified quantity of produce is not excused when the seller expected to fulfill the contract
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 17: 3-4
By the first decades of the twentieth century, there was a "fourth
class of cases . . . [with] impossibility . . .due to the failure of
some means of performance, contemplated but not contracted
for."'73 In Straus v. Kazenekas," Justice Curtis recognized this
out of particular land but was disappointed in this expectation. 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
1949 (1920). See, e.g., Anderson v. May, 50 Minn. 280, 52 N.W. 530 (1892).
73. 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1935 (1920).
74. 100 Conn. 581, 124 A. 234 (1924).
In Straus, the plaintiff agreed to sell, and the defendant to buy 20,000 rubles at "$22.75
per hundred rubles on 'future delivery,' same to be delivered as soon as practicable after
importation of Russian currency is permitted. ... Id. at 583. The plaintiff complained that
his offer of performance had not been accepted; the defendant specially defended and coun-
terclaimed that the "objects of the contract" had been commercially frustrated by an em-
bargo upon the importation of Russian currency which had continued for a longer time than
the parties had contemplated. A directed verdict and a judgment for the plaintiff were
affirmed, but only because there was an express provision in the contract concerning the effect
of the embargo then in existence.
The case comments upon the state of the law of impossibility in 1924: "The law as to
implied conditions in a contract excusing performance on the ground of impossibility, actual
or in a commercial sense, as implied by law, is of recent origin." Id. at 591. Under Paradine
v. Jane, impossibility would not excuse performance unless the parties had so provided in
their contract. But,
[slince the middle of the last century at least, the courts in England and in this
country have modified the rigid rule, upon the theory that the event which rendered
the performance impossible should be implied as a matter of law, as a condition
excusing performance.
Id. (emphasis added.)
The court ruled that the facts in Straus presented only a claim of impossibility in a
commercial sense implied by law and not an actual impossibility (physical performance of
the sale of the rubles could have taken place had the defendant been so disposed). And the
court found that the parties had agreed that the rubles should be delivered as soon as
practicable after the embargo on the importation of Russian currency was lifted. The parties
having thus provided for a certain contingency, it was not for the court "to import into the
contract some other and different provision for the same contingency." Thus, the defendant's
claim was held untenable. Since "the existence of an embargo of indefinite duration was not
only reasonably to have been anticipated, but was known to the parties to exist and the
contingency of its continuance provided for in the contract," it was held that the trial court
committed no error in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. But the court left the distinct
impression that another case with another set of facts might go the other way on the basis of
the new principles and conceptions articulated in Straus v. Kazemakas.
See Anderson v. Yaworski, 120 Conn. 390, 181 A. 205 (1935), where the "rule" of Straus
was applied to the sale of land.
See S. WILLISTON, CASES ON CONTRACTS 767 (1930), and S. WILLISTON, CASES ON CONTRACTS
724-25 (1937), concerning the question of whether a government embargo placed upon the
exportation of a commodity would be a defense to an action upon the contract involving the
commodity. Gray & Co., Inc. v. Cavalliotis, 276 F. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1921) is quoted to the effect
that an embargo by the government of the country in which the contract was made. and in
which it was to be performed was such a defense, while foreign embargoes were ordinarily
not an excuse for nonperformance.
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fourth, broader, exception to the strict theory of contract enforce-
ment:
4) the cessation of continuation of the existence of some thing
or state of things upon the continuation or cessation of which
the contract was known to depend, provided such cessation or
continuation arises without fault in either contracting party
75
The Justice noted the trend since the middle of the nineteenth
century for courts in England and America to imply a condition
excusing performance when a contingency arose that the parties had
not provided for in the contract. 7  The court cited Taylor v.
Caldwell"7 for the proposition that when the nature and circumstan-
ces of the contract indicate that the parties "must have known that
it could not be fulfilled unless . . . some particular thing or condi-
tion of things continued to exist," the parties will be deemed to have
contemplated this continued existence "as the foundation of what
was to be done. '78
Williston commented that this class of cases stood on "more de-
batable ground"79 and Justice Curtis confessed that the fourth ex-
ception was "difficult of a satisfactory statement."" Perhaps these
75. 100 Conn. at 592.
76. The court in Straus referred to four "implied conditions" which would excuse a party
before breach. Id. at 592. Other courts as well have used "implied condition" rather than
"exception" when dealing with these matters. See, e.g., Cosden Oil & Gas Co. v. Moss, 131
Okla. 48, 267 P. 855, 859 (1928); Gouled v. Holwitz, 95 N.J.L. 277, 113 A. 323, 324 (1921);
Cohen v. Morneault, 120 Me. 358, 114 A. 307, 308 (1921).
In Lorillard v. Clyde, 142 N.Y. 456, 37 N.E. 489 (1894), the court said that excuse by death
from performance.of a personal service contract was not an exception to the rule that con-
tracts voluntarily made are to be enforced; instead, courts "in accordance with the manifest
intention, construe the contract as subject to an implied condition that the person or thing
shall be in existence when the time of performance arrives." Id. at 491. See 15 HARv. L. REv.
63, 64 (1901): "The exceptions to the general rule that impossibility of performance is not a
defence have crept into the law, not as excuses, but under the cover of implied conditions."
See also Woodward, Impossibility of Performance, As An Excuse for Breach of Contract, 1
COLUM. L. REv. 529, 530 (1901).
77. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
78. 100 Conn. at 592, 124 A. at 238.
79. 3 WILUsSTON ON CoNTRACrs § 1935 (1920).
80. 100 Conn. at 592, 124 A. at 238.
See also Cosden Oil & Gas Co. v. Moss, 131 Okla. 49, 267 P. 855 (1928).
[Wihere it is apparent that a contract was entered into on the-basis of the existence
of something essential to its execution, there is the implied condition of contract that
if literal performance becomes impracticable or impossible by reason of the nonexist-
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reservations stem from the fact that the new type of implied condi-
tion referred to things or states or actions not specified in the written
contract. Implying a condition so would have been totally unaccept-
able in the days of strict Freedom of Contract, when the explicit
words of the contract were the entire contract and what the parties
said was all of what they meant.
This fourth exception to pacta sunt servanda was invoked in
International Paper Co. v. Rockefeller," involving a contract for
delivery of a large amount of spruce wood for use in making pulp.
After the defendant's timberland was almost totally destroyed by
fire, he was excused from providing more wood than he could pro-
vide from his land. The court ruled that performance should be
excused where the contract, read in connection with the known
facts, shows the source from which the parties contemplated the
wood should be furnished, and later the source is destroyed. Like-
wise, Kinser Construction Co. v. State2 used this expanded excep-
tive doctrine. The contract was for construction of a portion of the
New York State barge canal, pursuant to the Barge Canal Acts.
After a series of mud slides of "slippery, greasy clay," 3 the state
ence of the essential thing, to the extent of the nonexistence performance will be
excused ....
See also Woodward, supra note 76, at 533:
If the contingency which makes the contract impossible of performance is such that
the parties to the contract, had they actually contemplated it, would probably have
regarded it as so obviously terminating the obligation as not to require expression,
failure of performance should be excused.
Id.
This approach not only asks what the parties meant to happen, but also what the parties
would have meant had they contemplated a particular contingency. See also Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Hoyt, 149 U.S. 1 (1892):
[Wihere the event is of such character that it cannot reasonably be supposed to have
been in the contemplation of the contracting parties when the contract was made, they
will not be bound by general words, which though large enough to include were not
used with reference to the possibility of the particular contingency which afterwards
happens.
The case marked the beginning of a manifest tendency of United States courts to construe
contracts with more liberality. Conlen, supra note 2, at 31. The Hoyt test has a reasonableness
element, as does the following formulation: "Would the parties, as reasonable men, if their
attention had been called to the contingency, have provided for it in their contract?" Wood-
ward, supra note 76, at 533.
See Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 946-47. (1942)
and Conlen, supra note 2, for a comparison of the various tests.
81. 161 N.Y. App. Div. 180, 146 N.Y.S. 371 (1914).
82. 204 N.Y. 381, 97 N.E. 872 (1912).
83. Id. at 872.
1978-79 Contract Interpretation
issued a stop order. The court held that this was not a breach and
that the contractor was not entitled to recover profits lost by reason
of the stop order: "in a work of this magnitude the highest engineer-
ing skill, even when exercised with the utmost care, could not learn
in advance all the physical conditions to be met with during the
progress of the work."'" The trouble was not with the plan, but with
the earth, "which refused the support relied upon by both parties
."8. The contract was therefore discharged; the court declined
84. Id. at 875.
85. Id. at 876.
The general rule was that a contract ought to provide for all contingencies reasonably
within the anticipation of the parties "else the impossibility of performance resulting there-
from will not excuse either party from carrying out the contract." 100 Conn. at 594. If a
supervening event is foreseeable, contractual obligations must be qualified or later be held
absolute. "Foreseeability, however, is possible in almost every case." 5 FORDHAM L. Rav. 322,
331 (1936).
The foreseeability test descended from an earlier time when excuse from contract by impos-
sibility was rare:
Any kind of impossibility is more or less capable of anticipation. The question is one
of degree, and, if anticipated, any circumstance whatever may be guarded against in
the contract. In a contract for personal service, the contingency of possible illness or
death is very easily anticipated, and the possible destruction of the subject matter to
which a contract relates is also not difficult to anticipate, yet these kinds of impossibil-
ity excuse a promisor from liability.
3 WILISTON ON CONTMCTS § 1953 (1920).
Williston goes on to suggest a slight modification to make foreseeability helpful where the
contemplated means of performance fail. If the event that created the impossibility both
could have been anticipated and could have been guarded against by the promisor, one may
reasonably assume that the promisor assumed the risk of impossibility. This is also said to
be true if he has superior knowledge concerning the degree of risk.
In Berg v. Erickson, 234 F. 817 (8th Cir. 1916), Erickson, a resident of Kansas, was held to
his agreement to furnish "plenty of good grass" during the grazing season of 1913 in spite of
"the most severe drought which had been known in that part of Kansas .... " Id. at 818-
19. Berg knew nothing about the productive capacity of Kansas pastures and Erickson "knew
all about it," and he might have provided for such a contingency in the contract. Id. at 824.
The court read the contract as absolute because Erickson had not inserted a provision ex-
empting himself from liability in the event of severe drought.
See Savage v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 249 Or. 147, 432 P.2d 519, 522 (1967) ("To operate a
discharge . . . the hardship must be so extreme as to be outside any reasonable contempla-
tion of the parties"). But see Bennett, 72 Am. Dec. 373: "The cases make no distinction
between accidents that could be foreseen . . . . [Tihey all rest upon the simple princi-
ple-such is the agreement, clear and unqualified, and it must be performed, no matter what
the cost, if performance be not absolutely impossible." Id. at 376.
Berman notes that liberalization has taken place by expanding the definition of
"unforeseeable" to include what is merely improbable. Berman, supra note 59, at 1414. See
Kinser Const. Co. v. State, 204 N.Y. 381 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1912). The logical outcome of such
liberalization is that more performances are declared impossible; contracts after the turn of
the century have been less "absolute" than those before.
Duquesne Law Review
to apply literal Freedom of Contract and would not hold the parties
to it at all events.
THE FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE STANDARD
There is a fifth class of cases representing a way to get around the
strict (Freedom of Contract, so you must keep it) rule in impossibil-
ity cases:
5) [p]erformance remains entirely possible, but the whole
value of the performance to one of the parties at least, and the
basic reason recognized as such by both parties, for entering
into the contract has been destroyed by such supervening acci-
dent.86
Williston wrote that there had been "little clear recognition of this
class" by 1920, "but its adoption seems involved in some decisions,
and their justice is plain."8 These cases involve "frustration of pur-
pose": performance, still possible, is rendered undesirable due to
supervening events. 8 Shortly after the turn of the century,
"frustration" started to come in as a substitute for "impossibility."
As a term of art, "frustration" never acquired much precision
or clarity of meaning; most of the time it was used as a sort of
loose synonym for what had earlier been called "impossibility."
And yet, from the beginning, there was a general understand-
A related test is the contemplation of the parties test, which has been said to ask: What
would the parties have done had they anticipated the events which indeed happened? See 6
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1331 at 356-57 (1962). If their attention had been brought to the event
which subsequently happened, would the parties have thought it obvious that the contract
would then dissolve? Patterson, supra note 80, at 946. See Woodward, supra note 76, at 533;
Smith, supra note 12, at 681; 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 322, 331 (1936); Conlen, supra note 2, at 33.
Contemplation is akin to foreseeability. For exanple, in The Tornado, Ellis v. Atlantic
Mutual Insurance Co., 108 U.S. 342 (1883), a ship moored at wharf in New Orleans, bound
on a voyage to Liverpool "before she had broken ground for said voyage, was discovered to
be on fire in her hold." Id. at 343. The court held that the "circumstances with reference to
which the contract of affreightment was entered into were so altered by the supervening of
occurrences which it cannot be intended were within the contemplation of the parties in
entering into the contract, that the shipper and the underwriters were absolved from all
liability . . . ." Id. at 349. Alternatively, the court might have said that the burning of the
ship at the wharf was an unforeseeable event which dissolved the contract. See also Krause
v. Bd. of Trustees of School Town of Crothersville, 162 Ind. 278, 70 N.E. 264, 266 (1904).
86. 3 WILUSON ON CoNTRACrs § 1935 (1920).
87. Id., quoted in Perea v. Ilfeld, 33 N.M. 445, 270 P. 884-85 (1928).
88. 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1322 (1962).
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ing that the old theory of absolute-or almost abso-
lute-liability was in process of dissolution . ... [T]here has
been a liberalization of excuse .... 89
The whole notion of frustration of contract is said to have started
with the English case of Krell v. Hehry.0 Henry agreed to hire from
Krell a flat in Pall Mall for June 26th and 27th, the days announced
for the coronation procession of King Edward VII. However, the
agreement contained no explicit reference to the coronation or the
processions, and Henry declined to pay the balance of the rent after
learning that the serious illness of the King had occasioned the
cancellation of these events. The court ruled that both parties were
discharged from performance, since the coronation procession was
the foundation of the contract and since the illness of the King could
not reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the
parties. It was still possible for Henry to occupy Krell's flat on June
26th and 27th, but a supervening event (the King's sickness) had
destroyed the value of the flat for Henry. He was not made to pay
for a room that did not have a view of Edward VII's coronation
procession."
Krel is typically viewed as a shift from an objective impossibility
requirement to a frustration standard, the foundation of the agree-
89. DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note 18, at 80.
90. [1903] L.R. 2 K.B. 740. Another of the coronation cases is Chandler v. Webster, I
K.B. 493 (1904).
91. See Smith, supra note 12, at 674, to the effect that Krell is the first extension of the
implied condition into the area of nonmaterialization 6f a state of affairs which had served
as the foundation of a contract.
For history of the development of Krell in England, see Blackburn Bobbin Co., Ltd. v. T.W.
Allen & Sons, Ltd., [1918] 1 K.B. 540. See also The Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co.,
256 U.S. 619 (1921), where Mr. Justice Van Devanter began the opinion of the Court with
these words:
It long has been settled in the English courts and in- those of this country, federal and
state, that where parties enter into a contract on the assumption that some particular
thing essential to its performance will continue to exist and be available for the purpose
and neither agrees to be responsible for its continued existence and availability, the
contract must be regarded as subject to an implied condition that, if before the time
for performance and without the default of either party the particular thing ceases to
exist or be available for the purpose, the contract shall be dissolved and the parties
excused from performing it.
The parties were absolved from liability (although a chartered ship still existed and was
considered seaworthy) on the ground of an implied condition that the contract should end if
"before the time of the voyage the ship was rendered unavailable" by such a supervening act
as the requisition.
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ment having disappeared.92 But the coronation procession did not
only supply the purpose of the contract (for Henry) or the founda-
tion of the contract (for Krell and Henry), it was also part of the
subject of the contract. Krell and Henry made a deal concerning a
room with a view of the King's coronation procession. Performance
was not still possible after the supervening illness, for there was no
such room. Thus, it appears that frustration is but "a greater con-
templation of impossibility," 3 and this fifth exception to pacta sunt
servanda (a la Krell) seems collapsible into the fourth or third.
The seeds planted in Krell, however, sprouted as the doctrine of
the frustration of the commercial adventure, particularly after the
outbreak of World War I, when English and American courts con-
fronted total disruption of commercial affairs. 4 Recent years have
seen an expansion of this doctrine to many different kinds of con-
tracts.95 Clearly, this and the other exceptions to the strict Freedom
of Contract approach indicate a continued liberalization of impossi-
92. 34 YALE L.J. 91, 93 (1924).
93. Rothschild, The Doctrine of Frustration or Implied Condition in the Law of Contracts,
6 TEMPLE L.Q. 337 (1932). But see Conlen, supra note 2, at 89-90: the word "frustration" does
not connote impossibility and the cases in the United States where the rule has been applied
"are not all cases where performance of the contract was rendered actually impossible, but
only rendered so difficult of performance as to be regarded as not possible in the eyes of the
law, that is to say, not required to be done because impliedly not undertaken to be done."
Departing from Paradine, courts will decide the question of frustration with a view to the facts
that determine business judgment and action depending upon it. Id. at 94. See, e.g., Justice
Holmes' opinion in The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U.S. 12 (1917), holding that the master
of a ship was perfectly justified in turning back from a voyage to England on the eve of the
outbreak of World War I, thus failing to transfer kegs of gold. The master was not to be put
in the wrong "by nice calculations that if all went well he might have delivered the gold and
escaped capture by the margin of a few hours." The case ends with a Holmesian flourish:
"Business contracts must be construed with business sense, as they naturally would be
understood by intelligent men of affairs." Id. at 24.
94. See generally 5 FOEDHAM L. REV. 322, 322-37 (1936).
It has been suggested that the doctrine of frustration of the venture arose in a group of
cases in which the parties had, in fact, contemplated the occurrence of certain events and
the "question presented for decision was not one of impossibility, but of the true meaning
and intent of the parties." Page, supra note 11, at 604. This doctrine has been applied to many
different classes of contracts, id. at 610, and has been articulated more frequently in recent
decisions.
95. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944), Leonard v. Autocar Sales
& Services Co., 392 Ill. 182, 64 N.E.2d 477 (1945); Perry v. Champlain Oil Co., 101 N.H. 97,
134 A.2d 65 (1957). But see Knapp, supra note 60, at 473, for the suggestion that the doctrine
of commercial frustration has been honored more in the breach than in the observance in the
United States. See also, Anderson, Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1 (1953); Comment, 59 MICH. L. REV. 98 (1960).
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bility, and increased judicial involvement during the twentieth cen-
tury in private contracts that is consonant with the abandonment
of the old hands off policy in all aspects of American life.
IMPLIED CONDITIONS AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Judges at the turn of the century who more actively interpreted
contracts did not do so in their own right, or as a matter of law;
rather they invoked the "intention" of the parties and used the
theory of implied condition. Typical paths of inquiry were: What
did the parties mean? What would they have agreed to had they
thought of this contingency? What should they have meant were
they only reasonable? This way of reasoning was a response to the
earlier nineteenth century preoccupation with "meeting of the
minds"-the will theory of contract." Thus it was that a new gener-
ation of judges, with different philosophic and economic views, still
clung to the authority of previous decisions and previous grounds of
decision . 7
So thoroughly have we been schooled in the theory of freedom
of contract that not happily would we countenance judicial
action which seemed expressly to disregard the binding charac-
ter of the contractual relationship as expressed by those who
created it. In order to avoid the consequences of a literal appli-
cation and enforcement of the terms of a contract and yet to
forsake the support of the principle of contractual freedom, the
courts adopted the expedient of finding an implied intent of the
parties to excuse performance if and when performance became
impossible. 8
96. Implied condition was a bridge from a literal reading of contracts to a more interpre-
tive reading, with both techniques under the cloak of the maxim that courts do not make
contracts for parties. Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REv.
860, 862 (1968).
97. Williston, Freedom of Contract, supra note 4, at 369.
98. Smith, supra note 12, at 673. When a court implies a condition, it reflects the forces
and subcurrents of society.
You can always imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because
of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some
opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not
capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding
exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are battle grounds where the means do
not exist for determinations that shall be good for all time, and where the decision can
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With the implied condition technique, judges paid deference to
Freedom of Contract, while providing an opening for judicial inter-
pretation of contracts and excuse from performance on liberal
grounds of impossibility.
The court in Bennett would not insert for the benefit of one of the
parties "an exception which the parties have not, either by design
or neglect, inserted in their engagement."99 In Vogt v. Hecker""' the
principle of implied condition was recognized, but not applied, since
the contract was to erect a barn, rather than to repair one, Later
courts were more willing to imply a condition, and an illustration is
the 1916 case of Perlee v. Jeffcott. 10 1 Perlee gave Jeffcott the option
to purchase a farm and premises, but the barn was struck by light-
ning and with the other outbuildings was utterly destroyed before
performance had taken place. The court implied the condition that
if the barn burnt down the parties would be excused because they
had both "undoubtedly contemplated" the conveyance of the build-
ings and this was now impossible. A condition could be implied for
nearly any contract. 02 Said Justice Curtis in Straus: "The question
do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a given time and place. We
do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight
change in the habit of the public mind.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HIARv. L. REv. 457, 465 (1897). See Corbin, Conditions in
the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 746 (1919), where the growth of implied and construc-
tive conditions in the law is described as the process of courts finding "supposed" intentions
of the parties and construing conditions in order to do justice according to the mores of the
time.
99. 72 Am. Dec. at 376.
100. 118 Wis. 306, 95 N.W. 90 (1903).
101. 89 N.J. L. 34, 97 A. 789 (1916).
102. 3 WMSTON ON CoNTRACrs § 1937 (1920).
The implication of conditions has been criticized for the uncertainty and confusion that it
breeds. Woodward, supra note 76, at 532-33; Smith, supra note 12; Page, supra note 11, at
599-600; 27 CAL. L. REv. 460, 461 (1939); 5 FORDHAM L. REv., supra note 94, at 326, 326 n.38.
But see Conlen, supra note 2, at 39.
It is Corbin's position that it is better not to talk in terms of implied conditions if there
are no expressions in the contract justifying the court in finding that a promise is conditional
(if the "interpretative process involves no more than factual inference of probable intention
in the light of all relevant facts").
Justice is more likely to be done if the court is conscious that it is filling a gap that
the parties have left and uses language in its opinion that is not language of interpreta-
tion only . . . .In some instances, the court has recognized the fact that the parties
did not give any thought to the possibility of death or destruction. Judges have held
promises to be conditional expressly upon the ground that they believe that the parties
would have made them conditional in express terms if they had thought about it. They
are aware that they are holding the promise to be conditional because they think that
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is, was any condition, vital to the continued validity of this contract,
to be implied by law as a part of this contract from the circumstan-
ces surrounding the transaction and the condition of the parties?" 1
The idea of implied condition allowed judges to add things into
contracts, or provide for unprovided-for contingencies without de-
nouncing the absoluteness of contracts. Implying a condition merely
redefined the scope of the risks and duties under the con-
tract-which was still absolute (within new outlines):
One who makes a contract can never be absolutely certain that
he will be able to perform it when the time comes, and the very
essence of it is that he takes the risk withing the limits of his
undertaking. The modem cases may have abated somewhat
the absoluteness of the older ones in determining the scope of
the undertaking by the literal meaning of the words alone
S. .. But when the scope of the undertaking is fixed, that is
merely that the contractor takes the risk of the obstacles to that
extent. 04
In the same vein, the court in St. Joseph Hay & Feed Co. v.
Brewster'05 said that a promisor was absolved not because the un-
justice so requires, justice based upon custom, business practices, the mores of the
community.
6 CoRIwN ON CONTRICTS § 1331 (1962).
Therefore, Corbin suggests that all generalizations should be regarded as tentative working
rules to be continually re-examined in light of customs, business practices, the prevailing
mores of the time and place. Id.
103. 100 Conn. at 592. See also Hanford v. The Connecticut Fair Association, Inc., 92
Conn. 621, 103 A. 838 (1918); Cook v. McCabe, 53 Wis. 250, 10 N.W. 507 (1881); 3 WILLISTON
ON CONTMACTS § 1938 at 329 n.45.
"But the composition of an implied term is not an inevitable judicial response in the face
of silence." Farnsworth, supra note 96, at 861. Farnsworth points out that implying conditions
in the name of intention is peculiar to common law jurisdictions:
The civil law lawyer tends to think not of specific terms "implied" in the particular
case but of generalized rules which apply to all such cases unless the parties provide
otherwise. In France he calls these rules facultative, interpretative or suppletive as
opposed to those that are imperative and which he is powerless to alter. In Germany
he calls them ius dispositivum as opposed to ius cogens. Perhaps the happiest English
equivalents are "suppletive" and "mandatory." Since the civil law lawyer is accus-
tomed to finding them spelled out in a code in advance of controversy-the result of a
legislative rather than a judicial pronouncement-he is not tempted to attribute them
to the supposed "intentions" of the parties.
Id. at 861 n.7.
104. 'Day v. United States, 245 U.S. 159 (1917).
105. 195 S.W. 71 (1917).
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foreseen or unavoidable contingency excused him, but because the
contract bound him absolutely "only to perform under certain cir-
cumstances and conditions. . . ."10s No judge of the twentieth cen-
tury would even hint at sagging enthusiasm for Freedom of Con-
tract; that sacred value however, no longer dictates the same harsh
results in impossibility cases. The content of the concept has
changed with the times, as have prevailing socio-politico philoso-
phies.
CONCLUSION
A tiger has escaped from a travelling menagerie. The milkgirl
fails to deliver the milk. Possibily the milkman may be exoner-
ated from any breach of the contract; but even so, it would
hardly be reasonable to base that exoneration on the ground
that 'tiger days excepted' must be held as if written into the
milk contract.0 7
And so it has been said that the use of implied conditions in impos-
sibility cases is a pious fiction-a "fiction because it does not corre-
spond with anything that was in the minds of parties at the time;
pious because it seeks to do homage to a very sacred legal principle,
the sanctity of contract."'08 Further, some say that the faction is
harmful, for it cripples clearness of thought by bringing in false
notions of intention. 109
106. Id. at 72.
107. Lord Sands, Lord Ordinary of the Court of Sessions, in Scott & Sons v. Del Sol, 1922
S.C. [Session Cases] 592, 596-97, aff'd, 1923 S.C. (H.L.) 37, quoted in E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 822-23 (1972).
108. Id. See also 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 322, 337 (1936):
The coexistence of two basically opposed principles, the one demanding unswerving
adherence to obligations voluntarily undertaken, the other seeking to alleviate from
the burdens of unforeseen consequences despite the terms of the contract, either of
which the courts may very easily follow in a particular case, destroys certainty and
tends to increase litigation. Perhaps the courts have gone too far to retreat. It would
seem preferable to go the whole way and adopt outright the single principle that
impossibility of performance is always a defense, unless the promisor has expressly
undertaken to perform at all events.
109. "[Cjlearness of thought would be increased if it were plainly recognized that the
qualification or defense is not based on any expression of intention by the parties." 3
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1937 (1920). It is harmful for courts to talk "as if impossibility of
performance were a question of the actual intention of the parties, instead of operating only
when the parties had no intention as to the effect of the combination of facts which has arisen
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Some suggest that judges ought to avoid intervention beyond the
actual intention of the parties."10 Such an idea is easy to endorse,
yet difficult to effect. "Intention" is not easily definable or discerni-
ble, as we can see from this example by Wittgenstein:
Someone says to me: "Show the children a game." I teach them
gaming with dice, and the other says, "I didn't mean that sort
of game." Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come
before his mind when he gave me the order?"'
This is the judge's dilemma when faced with a contract not ex-
pressly providing for certain events which did happen. Dissolution
of strict adherence to the words of an agreement is the beginning of
inquiry about intention."2
• [The use of implied conditions] only pushes back the problem
a single stage. It leaves the question what is the reason for
implying a term . . . . The doctrine is invented by the court
in order to supplement the defects of the actual contract. The
parties did not anticipate fully and completely, if at all, or
provide for what actually happened. It is not possible . . . to
say that if they had thought of it they would have said: "Well,
after the contract was made, and which prevents performance." Page, supra note 11, at 600.
Farnsworth advocates the overthrow of implied condition because where there are no expec-
tations, it masks the real issues by encouraging courts to rationalize by means of fictitious
intention and where there are real expectations of the parties, it distorts them by casting them
in contractual terms. Farnsworth, supra note 96, at 867-68. As an alternative, he suggests that
courts assume that "parties form expectations with respect to only a limited number of
situations and that only some of these expectations, are, in turn, formulated as terms and
reduced to contractual language." Id. at 862.
It would be a significant contribution to clarity of thought in this important area of
contract law if courts would abandon the facade of the implied term and expose the
process of inference that lies behind it. To the extent that the process is premised on
the actual expectations of the parties, those expectations should be made clear. To the
extent that it is premised on a rule of fairness or justice, that rule should be articulated.
If, in Justice Holmes' words, courts decide as they do "because of some belief as to
the practice of a community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or
in short because of some attitude . . . upon a matter not capable of exact qualitative
measurement," it is not too much to ask that a court disclose the fact.
Id. at 879.
110. Smith, supra note 12, at 681.
ill. L. WrrrENsTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 33 (1953).
112. Perhaps parole evidence can be admitted to show what the agreement really was, as
in St. Joseph Hay & Feed Co. v. Brewster, 195 S.W. 71-73 (1917), and Berg v. Erickson, 234
F. 817, 823 (8th Cir. 1916). But what if there is no such evidence? What should a court do
when it appears that the contingency never crossed the minds of the parties?
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if that happens, all is over between us." On the contrary, they
would almost certainly on the one side or the other have sought
to introduce reservations or qualifications or compensations.
As to that the court cannot guess. What it can say is that the
contract either binds or does not bind."
The question then, is not what the parties intended but rather, how
the losses should be allocated, given this contingency under these
circumstances. The judicial function becomes one of weighing equi-
ties and balancing interests.
Williston has suggested that the true issue is whether unantici-
pated events have made performance of a contract vitally different
from what was reasonably expected." 4 If so, the court's focus should
not be the supposed original intentions of the parties, but the cir-
cumstances then existing. The task is to allocate "the burden of
unreasonably excessive risks which the parties have encountered
but which they did not, at the time the contract was made, foresee
or provide for and by reason of which a greatly increased burden is
placed upon the promisor at the time of performance."" 5 It is clear
that the allocation of unanticipated hardships caused by extraordi-
nary circumstances was the basic issue underlying the implication
113. Lord Wright, in Denny Mott & D.V. Fraser & Co., 1944 1 All Eng. 678, 171 L.T. 345,
113 L.J.P.C. 37, quoted in 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1331 (1962). See also Williston, Freedom
of Contract, supra note 4, at 365.
114. 3 WILUSmTON ON CONTRACTS § 1963 (1920).
115. Powers v. Siats, 244 Minn. 515, 70 N.W.2d 344 (1955). See also Carroll v. Bowersock,
100 Kan. 270, 164 P. 143, 144 (1917) (the law must deal with the new situation of the parties
created by a fire); Krause v. Bd. of Trustees of School Town of Crothersville, 162 Ind. 278,
70 N.E. 264 (1904) (the question is on which side the burden should fall). Law must go beyond
intentions of parties to settle controversies as to the distribution of gains and losses that the
parties did not anticipate. Cohen, supra note 49, at 591. The basic issue is how the law should
allocate unanticipated risks caused by extraordinary circumstances. SHEPHERD & SHER, supra
note 8, at 451.
The most famous recent illustration of loss distribution is the Westinghouse case. Having
contracted to supply utility companies with 70 million pounds of uranium, Westinghouse
Electric Corporation found itself with only 15 million pounds to supply. Total fulfillment of
the contracts would cost about $2 billion and would virtually bankrupt Westinghouse. Four-
teen separate actions by utility companies are currently pending. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has held that Westinghouse is liable but that the
plaintiffs will not be entitled to full damages. Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., No. 75-0514-R (E.D. Va., Oct. 27, 1978), at 22,320-32. How the losses should be
allocated is the question that remains. It is interesting, however, that the court is not tending
toward a decision under Comment 6 of the U.C.C. § 2-615, but may decide the issue of
damages on anticipatory repudiation grounds-using the date of breach as the loss divider.
Id.
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of many a condition by judges at the turn of the century and later. ",6
Allocation might be accomplished by a judicial decree modifying
the contract that had been rendered impossible. Although this flies
in the face of the old adage that courts do not make contracts for
people, something of the sort -has been done for over one hundred
years through use of the quasi-contract theory. 117
In recent years suggestions for loss-splitting and for contract
modifications, as techniques that should be recognized and
openly applied by courts, have come to the surface in what
appears to be increasing frequency. The future course of the
law may well be set in this direction although it is too early to
tell whether the course will be marked by the meandering con-
fusion of a case law development or by the more channeled line
of statutory reform."8
116. "[Cjonstructions are to be with equity and moderation, to moderate the rigor of the
law." Grounds of Law and Equity, 38 Ca. 49, quoted in Krause v. Bd. of Trustees of School
Town of Crothersville, 162 Ind. 278, 70 N.E. 264, 267 (1904). Around 1919, there appeared an
increasing tendency to found relief upon equitable principles, where great hardship would
result from holding the parties to a contract which had become practically impossible. See
Paxton Lumber Co. v. Panther Coal Co., 83 W.Va. 341, 98 S.E. 563 (1919).
In England, also, courts have been turning away from a Taylor v. Caldwell type of implied
condition, and are "determining what they believe the justice of the time requires with
respect to events unforeseen by the parties and not provided for by agreement." 6 CoRiwN ON
CoNmTACTs § 1331 at 358 n.61 (1962).
117. F. KESSLER & G. GILMoRE, CoNTRAcrs, CASES AND MATERLkS 744 (1974).
Losses ought to be allocated based upon reason informed by custom, business practice,
common feeling, the mores of the community. Corbin, Recent Developments in Contracts,
50 HAuv. L. REv. 449, 465-66 (1937). Cf. Berman, supra note 59, at 1418 n.ll; Patterson, supra
note 80, at 905; Conlen, supra note 2, at 94.
The recognition is gaining ground that where constructive conditions of exchange and
of cooperation are implied, courts, instead of finding the intention of the parties, apply
considerations of equity and justice, and that supplementation of a contract is by no
means a novel judicial activity.
Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 COLUm. L. REv.
287, 312 (1958).
Pound speaks of the rise of "a humanitarian idea of lifting or shifting burdens and losses
so as to put them upon those better able to bear them. Belief in the obligatory force of
contracts and respect for the given word are going, if not in some spots actually gone, in the
law of today [1954]." Pound, supra note 9, at 163.
118. KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 116, at 744.
The one-time general proposition that courts cannot make contracts over for the par-
ties, that freedom of contract implies the possibility of contracting foolishly, is giving
way to a power of the service state to act as guardian of persons of age, sound mind,
and discretion, and relieve them by judicial action from their contracts, or make their
contracts over for them, or make their promises easier for them.
Pound, supra note 9, at 167.
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Such an observation could only have been made at a time when
laissez-faire had been toppled from its nineteenth century place of
honor-a time when judges no longer feel constrained to cloak their
opinions in phrases having to do with the intention, wills, contem-
plation, of the parties and when freedom of contract is no longer the
strict, literal, laissez-faire concept that it was once.
Pound was less than enthusiastic about this development:
If letting people of full age and sound mind contract freely and holding them rigidly
to the contracts they made was carried to an extreme in the last century, a system of
restricting free contract and relaxing the olbigation of contract may be carried quite
as far in reaction, and the spirit of the time seems to be pushing everywhere to that
other extreme.
We are told that the meaning is distilled from the words. It might be suggested that
distilling is often illicit and the product moonshine.
Pound, supra note 117, at 116, 167.
It may indeed be true that "the tendency of every body of law which rests upon precedent
is to develop into a chaotic mass of formless pseudo-equity." The Need of Law Reform, The
Doctrine of Frustration of Adventure, 38 CAN. L. TIMES 86, 86, 151, 223, quoted in Page, supra
note 11, at 613.
